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ü Summary
Democratic nations are advised to have parliaments select the chief executive by the Borda Fixed Point method. The
current practice of having direct popular elections using systems that have originated in history is inoptimal and actually
quite undemocratic since winners are selected who don’t reflect the national sentiment. The paper gives the example of
the 2007 French presidential elections. Under the currently and historically grown system of run-off plurality Sarkozy
got elected while the more democratic method of Borda Fixed Point would have generated Bayrou. The example uses
reasonable assumptions on underlying micro preferences. The parliamentary vote that followed the presidential vote and
that annihilated Bayrou increased the paradox but not the principles involved.
 
Introduction
What would be a proper democratic voting system ? Given the widely differing opinions of voters and the long lists of
candidates, it is generally advisable to use indirect representative democracy and proportional representation. In parlia-
mentary elections, parties advocate their preferences,  the popular vote determines party sizes, whereupon the elected
party professionals can arrive at the final choice of the executive by using both bargaining and more complex voting
schemes, in particular  the Borda  Fixed Point  method. In this manner the information overload  is reduced,  both for
voters who don’t have to think about long lists of candidates and for voting mechanisms that don’t have to calculate
with millions of  different preferences.  Representative democracy also allows for  bargaining that allows for optimal
compromises.
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France in the Spring of 2007 would seem to provide a good testing ground for this theory since there were both presiden-
tial and parliamentary elections.  The French first had the direct  presidential  vote on April  22 and May 6 and only
secondly the parliamentary vote on June 10 and 17. This order turns the parliamentary vote into a rally for support of
the just elected president. Also, the elections were run-off systems that do not generate proportionality. By consequence,
France showed two voting paradoxes. The first paradox is that Sarkozy got elected president while it should have been
Bayrou, the second paradox is that the parliamentary vote, that followed the presidential one, was in support of Sarkozy
and almost annihilated Bayrou, and thus did not expose the first paradox. Thus what happened was that a president got
elected by a wrong system and that subsequently popular opinions were somewhat adjusted towards that result, by a
sufficient amount such that the subsequently wrong system seemed to generate that support.
These are fundamental issues. One might hold that the election of the executive is a different one than the election of the
legislative. Or one might hold that voters would be rational under any voting system so that they would adjust their
strategies accordingly so that the final result would always be the same. The literature on voting theory is huge, starting,
incidently with the French theorists Borda and Condorcet.
This paper has a limited objective. It will take the first paragraph as the summary conclusion of the literature on “voting
theory for democracy”. It will subsequently concentrate on the French presidential election as an instance of the “direct
single seat election” where a body of voters has to select a single item from a list of candidates. It will use the French
data and compare the current French system with the Borda Fixed Point  method. Appendix A  contains some other
direct single seat election methods. Subsequently, the paper will conclude and close the main point of this paper. Which
main point is that, in a democracy, we would have parliaments that use the Borda Fixed Point to select the executive.
This  limited objective  of  this paper  is  fully supported  by Colignatus (2007b)  “Voting theory for  democracy”,  2nd
edtion, and it uses the voting routines in “The Economics Pack” which routines only exist for direct single seat elec-
tions. 
For  completeness,  Appendix  B  collects  some notes  on  the  French  parliamentary  elections.  The  Economics  Pack
currently contains no routines for multiple seat elections. It is not likely that these will be created in the near future.
These would be superfluous for a national proportional representation or for a district single representative election or
for some combinations of those. These would be rather complex for other cases and likely depend upon local ideosyncra-
cies. 
Direct single seat elections
In a direct single seat election, there are (1) a list of items to select one off, (2) voters, e.g. partitioned in parties with
weights, (3) the preferences of the voters. Voters can cheat on their preferences and a first way to limit the scope for
cheating is to allow for only ordinal preferences.  This paper  develops a voting example using the 2007 presidential
elections in France. It is an example only, and the discussion below will emphasize the limitations of the example. 
The selection of a winner in a national election depends not only upon the person’s qualities but also upon the voting
method. In the 2007 French presidential elections Sarkozy was selected by the current voting method but it should not
come as a surprise that under another system Bayrou would have won. What might come as a surprise however is that
the current system is not really democratic and that there is a democratic system that would have favoured Bayrou.
The current French presidential election system is called run-off plurality. The two candidates with the most votes of the
first round go on to the second round. The run-off plurality scheme has the property of destroying voter preferences, and
a ruthless cut-off is used to achieve the simplicity of a final binary choice. An alternative is the Borda Fixed Point
method. That method (i) uses all preferences, (ii) allows for some intensity of preference indicated by rank order, (iii)
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includes the condition that the winner should also win from its main contender, (iv) finds this main contender under the
counterfactual that the winner would not partake. By the current system, Sarkozy got elected. By the Borda Fixed Point
method Bayrou would have been elected. 
What is relevant for the present discussion are not the candidates and their qualities but the properties of these methods.
Run-off plurality is less democratic than Borda Fixed Point. In fact, the system used in France is quite undemocratic
since the voters get a president that they would not prefer under optimal voting conditions.
This paper does not discuss historical issues. They may be briefly indicated for perspective. For historical reasons, some
countries  still  use direct  presidential  elections.  Their  methods of selection create  all  kinds of voting paradoxes  and
frequently lead to choices that do not properly reflect national sentiment. The main voting paradox is that the “popular
vote” is said to serve the interests of the voters while instead that direct method goes against the voters’ interest. Histori-
cally, the current suboptimal situation in national elections can best be explained by a serious deficiency by voting
theorists.  The  explanation is stated  in Colignatus (2007b)  and  can be briefly summarized as follows. Starting with
Kenneth Arrow in 1951 voting theorists have emphasized impossibilities and paradoxes in voting instead of designing
systems that  would work. This  has  resulted  into  a  literature  that  is  pervasive in its  cynicism and anti-democractic
inclination. Some authors even advise dictatorship. In a massive “betrayal by the clerks”, voting theorists at the aca-
demia have entrenched points of view and are not open to the idea of optimal voting methods. As a result, democracy
suffers greatly, not only in national elections but also in, say, union elections or company board elections. It helps to
have examples that show avenues for improvement.
The data
For voting we need items (candidates), voter preferences, and voter weights.
The following data on France have been retrieved from Wikipedia (2007). This internet encyclopedia can be unstable,
both over long periods of time (a shift of interest) and even at freak moments (a hacker), but the retrieved data fit some
other reports in the media. The following table summarizes the data in a useful format.
The voting items are in the rows and the voting rounds are in the columns. The main contenders are Sarkozy and Royal,
who move on to the second round. The third column gives an estimate how the Bayrou vote of the first round was split
over Sarkozy and Royal in the second round,  with a remainder of either blank or  spoilt  vote (“Zero2”).  This table
expresses an assumption that all votes for Le Pen in the first round went to Sarkozy in the second round, so that some
3.7 million from Bayrou’s first round helped Sarkozy in the second round. The table also expresses the assumption that
all votes of the smaller leftist groups in the first round went to Royal in the second round, so that some 2.6 million of
Bayrou’s first round helped Royal in the second round. The number of voters in the 2nd round was also a bit larger, with
the difference indicated in the row “New”.
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DataTable
Round1 Round2 Bayrou2nd
Sarkozy 11448663 18983408 -
LePen 3834530 - -
Sarkozy2 - - 3700215
Royal 9500112 16790611 -
Leftist 4695327 - -
Royal2 - - 2595172
Bayrou 6820119 - -
Other 420645 - -
Valid 36719396 35774019 -
Zero 534846 1569450 -
Zero2 - - 524732
New - - 89227
Total 37254242 37343469 -
The lower rows give blank or spoilt votes and people abstaining in the first round and joining up in the second round.
The available data only give a net number and it may be that even more people joined while compensating for others
dropping out. Overall turnout was about 84% so potentially there can be quite some flows here. The sizable increase in
blank and spoilt votes in the second round is a bit curious since the whole system is intended such that there are only
two options available in that second round and thus it makes little sense to try to insert a third option - though people
apparently did.
Assumptions on preferences
Above assumptions already show that we lack proper data on the preferences. The available data are at the aggregate
level, give us only a first and second choice for the total. At the micro level anything might be possible. This means that
the discussion here is only indicative. But the example remains sufficiently clear for our stated purpose, to show that the
current French voting system is inoptimal (even though it is better than the US system). Any example suffices, also a
fabricated  one.  For  the  2007  French presidential  elections  we can  make some reasonable  assumptions so  that  the
example becomes a bit more realistic.
The following assumptions namely seem reasonable approximations. In this section we express the preferences by lists
of names of decreasing preference. (Eventually the voting routines use lists with increasing preferences.)
(1) For voters on Sarkozy in the first round, perhaps a large share would vote for LePen as second choice. How many, is
unknown. It is not so meaningful to use Le Pen’s score against Chirac some years ago, since that was another candidate,
and some years ago. We can insert an arbitrary split, say with 2 million voters. The majority of Sarkozy’s voters would
put Le Pen at the bottom of the list.
x = 2000000;
sA = 811448663 − x,
8Sarkozy, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Royal, LePen, Leftist<<;
sB = 8x, 8Sarkozy, LePen, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Royal, Leftist<<;
(2) The voters for Le Pen would prefer Sarkozy in the second round and Bayrou above others.
l = 83834530, 8LePen, Sarkozy, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Royal, Leftist<<;
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(3) The Royal backing might have some subgroups who put Sarkozy or even LePen in second place. We neglect the
possibility of such subgroups however, selecting only one single preference, that puts Bayrou in third place.
r = 89500112, 8Royal, Leftist, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Sarkozy, LePen<<;
(4) The extreme left might rather abstain than vote for Royal or Bayrou. But overall it seems reasonable that we assign
Royal to the second position and Bayrou to the third.
left =
84695327, 8Leftist, Royal, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Sarkozy, LePen<<;
(5) The Bayrou vote is the one that we need to split.
bA = {3700215, {Bayrou, Sarkozy, Other, Zero, Abstain, Royal, LePen, 
Leftist}};
bB = {2595172, {Bayrou, Royal, Other, Zero, Abstain, Sarkozy, LePen, 
Leftist}};
bC = {524732, {Bayrou, Zero, Abstain, Sarkozy, Royal, Other, LePen, 
Leftist}};
(6) For the other vote on the right we can assume the most interesting case that their second vote is for Sarkozy.
o = 8420645, 8Other, Sarkozy, Bayrou, Zero, Abstain, LePen, Royal, Leftist<<;
(7) The zero (blank or spoilt) vote of the first round is marginal and gets an arbitray allocation. But they are not moti-
vated to vote for the main contenders, so those drop to the lowest positions.
z = 8534846, 8Zero, Abstain, Other, Leftist, Bayrou, LePen, Royal, Sarkozy<<;
(8) The people who abstained in the first round but joined in the second round are a curious lot. There can all kinds of
psychological considerations here, but the simplest one is that their second vote is a protest,  where they move from
abstinention to zero. Note though that this is a net number, so the true process might be more complex.
a = 889227, 8Abstain, Zero, Other, Leftist, Bayrou, LePen, Royal, Sarkozy<<;
In summary, we have these assumptions on the preferences, reading a high value on the left and a low value on the right.
PrefData = 8sA, sB, l, r, left, bA, bB, bC, o, z, a<
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
9448663 8Sarkozy, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Royal, LePen, Leftist<
2000000 8Sarkozy, LePen, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Royal, Leftist<
3834530 8LePen, Sarkozy, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Royal, Leftist<
9500112 8Royal, Leftist, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Sarkozy, LePen<
4695327 8Leftist, Royal, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain, Sarkozy, LePen<
3700215 8Bayrou, Sarkozy, Other, Zero, Abstain, Royal, LePen, Leftist<
2595172 8Bayrou, Royal, Other, Zero, Abstain, Sarkozy, LePen, Leftist<
524732 8Bayrou, Zero, Abstain, Sarkozy, Royal, Other, LePen, Leftist<
420645 8Other, Sarkozy, Bayrou, Zero, Abstain, LePen, Royal, Leftist<
534846 8Zero, Abstain, Other, Leftist, Bayrou, LePen, Royal, Sarkozy<
89227 8Abstain, Zero, Other, Leftist, Bayrou, LePen, Royal, Sarkozy<
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
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Setting up the voting problem
We already mentioned the items:
Items = 8Sarkozy, LePen, Royal, Leftist, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain<;
We select the votes from the PrefData and check that their total is indeed the total of the second round.
Votes = First ê@ PrefData
89448663, 2000000, 3834530, 9500112, 4695327, 3700215, 2595172, 524732, 420645, 534846, 89227<
% êê Add
37343469
For the voting routines we assign scores 1 to 8 to the candidates, giving the highest value to the candidate of the highest
preference. The order  of the Items determines where a score is put. For example, the voters for Sarkozy will assign
value 8 to the first position, Sarkozy, 7 to their second choice Bayrou in the 5th position, and so on.
prefs = PrefToList ê@ HPref @@ # &L ê@ Reverse ê@ Last ê@ PrefData
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
8 2 3 1 7 6 5 4
8 7 2 1 6 5 4 3
7 8 2 1 6 5 4 3
2 1 8 7 6 5 4 3
2 1 7 8 6 5 4 3
7 2 3 1 8 6 5 4
3 2 7 1 8 6 5 4
5 2 4 1 8 3 7 6
7 3 2 1 6 8 5 4
1 3 2 5 4 6 8 7
1 3 2 5 4 6 7 8
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
This gives all elements to set up the voting problem. The votes will be expressed as ratio’s summing to 1.
SetVotingProblem@Votes, Items, prefsD
:Number of Voters Ø 11, Number of itemsØ 8, Votes are nonnegative and add up to 1 Ø True,
Preferences fit the numbers of Voters and ItemsØ True, Type of scale Ø Ordinal,
Preferences give a proper ordering Ø True, Preferences add up to Ø 836<,
ItemsØ 8Sarkozy, LePen, Royal, Leftist, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain<, Votes Ø : 9448663ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
2000000
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
3834530
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
3166704
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
1565109
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
1233405
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
2595172
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
524732
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ ÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
140215
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
178282
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
89227
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
>>
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The run-off plurality routine
To properly model run-off plurality we would have to account for shifts in preferences and participation between the
rounds. The candidates would keep the same name but they might shift their political positions. The following routine
however is simple, assumes that the numbers and preferences are exactly the same for the first and second round, and it
does not account for abstination and zero votes other than including them in the items. By consequence we get slightly
different numbers than the official figures. De denominators include not just the “valid” votes but also the zero and new
ones. The 1.6 million “zero” votes of the second round are allocated to either Sarkozy or Royal, so that in this simula-
tion run both get slightly more votes. (PM. To get the same result in the second round as in the official figures we might
substract the 1.6 million zero votes from both rounds, and distribute this proportionally. It is needlessly complicated to
do this just for this example.)
RunOffPlurality@D êê N
CheckVote::adj :  NumberOfItems adjusted to 2
:First Ø
:Sum Ø
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
Abstain 0.00238936
Bayrou 0.182632
Leftist 0.125734
LePen 0.102683
Other 0.0112642
Royal 0.254398
Sarkozy 0.306577
Zero 0.0143223
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
, Ordering Ø
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
0.00238936 Abstain
0.0112642 Other
0.0143223 Zero
0.102683 LePen
0.125734 Leftist
0.182632 Bayrou
0.254398 Royal
0.306577 Sarkozy
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
, Max Ø 8Sarkozy, 0.306577<, Select Ø 8<>,
Sum Ø
i
k
jjRoyal 0.466338
Sarkozy 0.533662
y
{
zz, Ordering Ø ik
jj 0.466338 Royal
0.533662 Sarkozy
y
{
zz, Max Ø 8Sarkozy, 0.533662<, Select Ø Sarkozy>
The Borda Fixed Point routine
Using the Borda Fixed Point routine, Bayrou is selected.
BordaFP@D
Bayrou
It appears that Bayrou would already have been selected by the Borda method itself but his position is also stable in the
sense that adding or removing a candidate would not quickly change his winning status.
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BordaAnalysis@D êê N
:Select Ø Bayrou, BordaFPQ Ø 8True<,
WeightTotalØ 84.99957, 2.53173, 4.88274, 3.47337, 6.58486, 5.444, 4.53948, 3.54426<,
Position Ø H 5. L, Ordering Ø
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
2.53173 LePen
3.47337 Leftist
3.54426 Abstain
4.53948 Zero
4.88274 Royal
4.99957 Sarkozy
5.444 Other
6.58486 Bayrou
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
>
In this case we have lumped together all  “other” candidates  into one person,  “who” comes as a surprising second.
Perhaps our results have been overly influenced by this ? The following section shows that this is not the case.
Reducing the number of candidates
From the list of preferences we can also select just the three main contenders. In that case the preferences range from 1
to 3 instead of 1 to 8. The main conclusion does not change. The run-off plurality scheme selects Sarkozy while Borda
FP selects Bayrou.
ReduceVotingProblem@8Sarkozy, Royal, Bayrou<D
CheckVote::adj :  NumberOfItems adjusted to 3
:Number of Voters Ø 11, Number of itemsØ 3, Votes are nonnegative and add up to 1 Ø True,
Preferences fit the numbers of Voters and ItemsØ True, Type of scale Ø Ordinal,
Preferences give a proper ordering Ø True, Preferences add up to Ø 86<,
ItemsØ 8Sarkozy, Royal, Bayrou<, Votes Ø : 9448663ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
2000000
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
3834530
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
3166704
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
1565109
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
1233405
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
2595172
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
524732
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
140215
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ ÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
178282
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
89227
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
>>
Preferences
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
3 1 2
3 1 2
3 1 2
1 3 2
1 3 2
2 1 3
1 2 3
2 1 3
3 1 2
1 2 3
1 2 3
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
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RunOffPlurality@D êê N
CheckVote::adj :  NumberOfItems adjusted to 2
:First Ø :Sum Ø
i
k
jjjjjjjj
Bayrou 0.199344
Royal 0.380132
Sarkozy 0.420524
y
{
zzzzzzzz, Ordering Ø
i
k
jjjjjjjj
0.199344 Bayrou
0.380132 Royal
0.420524 Sarkozy
y
{
zzzzzzzz, Max Ø 8Sarkozy, 0.420524<, Select Ø 8<>,
Sum Ø
i
k
jjRoyal 0.466338
Sarkozy 0.533662
y
{
zz, Ordering Ø ik
jj 0.466338 Royal
0.533662 Sarkozy
y
{
zz, Max Ø 8Sarkozy, 0.533662<, Select Ø Sarkozy>
BordaFP@D
Bayrou
BordaAnalysis@D êê N
:Select Ø Bayrou, BordaFPQ Ø 8True<,
WeightTotalØ 81.95419, 1.84647, 2.19934<, Position Ø H 3. L, Ordering Ø
i
k
jjjjjjjj
1.84647 Royal
1.95419 Sarkozy
2.19934 Bayrou
y
{
zzzzzzzz>
Strategy
If Bayrou had made it  to  the second round then he would have beaten Sarkozy. One can imagine different voting
strategies coming into play. Royal could have known this already and withdrawn from the race.  Vanity gave her a
president who may be opposite to her ideals. But perhaps if she had dropped from the race, voters would have started
regarding Bayrou as a socialist candidate, so that he might have lost his overall appeal. So, Royal’s supporters perhaps
should have been wiser than she is and voted for Bayrou already in the first round. Perhaps many Sarkozy voters voted
for Royal to make sure that she got more votes than Bayrou.
Whatever all that may be, given above preferences, Bayrou would beat Sarkozy, which is one reason why he is a Borda
Fixed Point winner. The Borda Fixed Point method is not immune to strategic voting but less sensitive than current
systems.
WinnerOfPair@Sarkozy, BayrouD
Bayrou
Conclusion
Above discussion has taken aggregate data from the 2007 French presidential elections, added some arbitrary though
not unreasonable assumptions on the underlying preferences, and showed that the winner depends, once the preferences
are given, upon the voting method. The situation can be judged on the properties of these methods. 
Democratic nations are advised to have parliaments select the chief executive by the Borda Fixed Point method, where
those parliaments are proportional representations. The current practice of having direct popular elections using systems
that have originated in history is inoptimal and actually quite undemocratic.
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The main conclusion of this paper is for students of voting theory, and in particular for those without vested interests in
current theoretical errors. Voting theory, both in the academic journals and in public statements, needs to be realigned
with Colignatus (2007b) since otherwise democratic nations get wrong advice.
Appendix A: Other voting systems
ü Introduction
The body of the text compares the current French system for electing a president, that happens to be “run-off plurality”,
with the Borda  Fixed Point  method. This  appendix  states the results of  some other systems. It  is  not necessary to
evaluate these other systems in full since this is done in Colignatus (2007b) and in the literature in general. It may only
be useful to state the current outcomes and perhaps provide a short comment.
Resetting the main data:
Items = 8Sarkozy, LePen, Royal, Leftist, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain<;
SetVotingProblem@Votes, Items, prefsD
:Number of Voters Ø 11, Number of itemsØ 8, Votes are nonnegative and add up to 1 Ø True,
Preferences fit the numbers of Voters and ItemsØ True, Type of scale Ø Ordinal,
Preferences give a proper ordering Ø True, Preferences add up to Ø 836<,
ItemsØ 8Sarkozy, LePen, Royal, Leftist, Bayrou, Other, Zero, Abstain<, Votes Ø : 9448663ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
2000000
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
3834530
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
3166704
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
1565109
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
1233405
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
2595172
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
524732
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ ÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
,
140215
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
178282
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
12447823
,
89227
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
37343469
>>
StatusQuo@D = Abstain
Abstain
ü Borda
We already have seen the Borda result above but it can be useful to explicitly mention it just by itself.
Borda@D
Bayrou
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BordaAnalysis@D êê N
:Select Ø Bayrou, BordaFPQ Ø 8True<,
WeightTotalØ 84.99957, 2.53173, 4.88274, 3.47337, 6.58486, 5.444, 4.53948, 3.54426<,
Position Ø H 5. L, Ordering Ø
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
2.53173 LePen
3.47337 Leftist
3.54426 Abstain
4.53948 Zero
4.88274 Royal
4.99957 Sarkozy
5.444 Other
6.58486 Bayrou
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
>
ü Condorcet
Bayrou is also the Condorcet winner. There is no cycle.
PairwiseMajority@D êê N
:VoteMargin Ø VoteMargin
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
0. 0.761211 0.0673237 0.206313 -0.158951 0.0447953 0.0392207 0.0392207
-0.761211 0. -0.631569 0.206313 -0.687521 -0.687521 -0.687521 -0.687521
-0.0673237 0.631569 0. 0.715109 -0.239736 -0.0726441 -0.100747 -0.100747
-0.206313 -0.206313 -0.715109 0. -0.206313 -0.239736 -0.239736 -0.239736
0.158951 0.687521 0.239736 0.206313 0. 0.944048 0.966577 0.966577
-0.0447953 0.687521 0.0726441 0.239736 -0.944048 0. 0.938474 0.938474
-0.0392207 0.687521 0.100747 0.239736 -0.966577 -0.938474 0. 0.995221
-0.0392207 0.687521 0.100747 0.239736 -0.966577 -0.938474 -0.995221 0.
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
,
1. Ø 8StatusQuo Ø Abstain, Sum Ø 86., 1., 2., 0., 7., 5., 4., 3.<, Max Ø 7., Condorcet winner Ø Bayrou,
Pref Ø PrefHLeftist, LePen, Royal, Abstain, Zero, Other, Sarkozy, BayrouL,
Find Ø Bayrou, LastCycleTestØ False, Select Ø Bayrou<,
N Ø 8Sum Ø 80.999133, -3.93655, 0.76548, -2.05326, 4.16972, 1.88801, 0.0789547, -1.91149<,
Pref Ø PrefHLePen, Leftist, Abstain, Zero, Royal, Sarkozy, Other, BayrouL, Select Ø Bayrou<, All Ø Bayrou>
ü Plurality
Sarkozy gets the most votes but not more than 50% (when allowing for the whole field).
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Plurality@D êê N
:Sum Ø
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
Abstain 0.00238936
Bayrou 0.182632
Leftist 0.125734
LePen 0.102683
Other 0.0112642
Royal 0.254398
Sarkozy 0.306577
Zero 0.0143223
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
, Ordering Ø
i
k
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
0.00238936 Abstain
0.0112642 Other
0.0143223 Zero
0.102683 LePen
0.125734 Leftist
0.182632 Bayrou
0.254398 Royal
0.306577 Sarkozy
y
{
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
, Max Ø 8Sarkozy, 0.306577<, Select Ø 8<>
ü Approval
Under strategic behaviour approval voting reduces to Plurality. Otherwise approval voting requires a base from which
approval is measured, which base can vary per individual. Assuming that the base is uniformly the same, e.g. as absten-
tion, is a rather strong assumption. It would be misleading to present a calculation here.
ü Pareto
Pareto voting would hold that a voter could veto any result that would be worse than the status quo. In this case we
would choose the status quo as individual abstention so that a veto would be immaterial. The issue only arises materially
when there would be proposals on the table that infringe upon individual or minority rights.
Appendex B: Notes on the French parliamentary elections 2007
ü The system
Wikipedia (2007b): “The procedure by which deputies are elected is a mixture of first past the post and run-off systems.
A candidate must take an absolute majority (more than 50%) in their constituency to win in the first round, and receive
the support of at least 25% of all registered voters. Otherwise, if they get at least 12.5% of the votes of all registered
voters in the first round, or are one of the top two candidates remaining, they go through to the second round, where
only a simple plurality is needed to win.”
The number of seats is 577. The first round was on June 10 and the second on June 17. 
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ü Limitations
NRC Handelsblad (2007a): (i) districts, non proportional, run-off plurality, (ii) double mandats, “the current Assemblée
has for example 269 mayors and hundres of regional parliamentarians. Only 56 members have no other governmental
function. Eleven ministers are candidate in their own district.” (iii) “if a president asks a majority then he gets one”. (iv)
Quote: “France is a one-party state”. (v) Premier Jospin created in 2001 the system to have first the presidential election
before the parliamentary election, “in order to prevent the risk of a cohabitation” (president and premier of different
political ideas), (vi) Quote of Christophe Barbier, editor-in-chief of L’Express: “parliament is in a permanent state of
disintegration”. (vii) Quote of Guy Carcassone, Univ. Nanterre: “Parliament does not play its intended role as balancing
power.” (viii) Quote of Phillipe Manière, Institut Montaigne: “France is an incomplete democracy, a monarchy that
never has ended”.
NRC Handelsblad (2007b) (after the first round): (i) “President Sarkozy and premier Fillon are already certain of an all
powerful majority.” (ii) “The French “agenda law”: when the elections for parliament are just after those for the presi-
dent, the party of the president will win”. 
Some points in the political analysis: (i) The winning president expresses all kinds of promisses and starts with sweets,
saving the sour for after the parliamentary elections, (ii) politicians from the losing sides switch loyalty to get on board
still just in time.
ü The results
The results have been taken from French Government (2007) and Wikipedia (2007b). By themselves, the results seem a
bit opaque because the much larger abstention and the seeming swings between the rounds. In the first round 110 seats
are taken, of which 98 by Sarkozy, so the results of the second round are no longer representative. 
The best comparison can be made between the first rounds of both the presidential and parliamentary elections, and the
final results in parliamentary seats. Percentages can be expressed in terms of the valid votes, obliterating the no-shows
and protest votes. The difference of 2 million in registered voters by the way is not negligible.
DataTableParl
Pres-1 Parl-1 Seats
Sarkozy 11448663 10289028 313
Rightist - 1570630 32
LePen 3834530 1116005 0
Royal 9500112 6436136 186
Leftist 4695327 2818640 41
Bayrou 6820119 1981121 3
Other 420645 1811472 2
Valid 36719396 26023032 577
Zero 534846 9201921 -
Total 37254242 35224953 577
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DataTableParlPerc
Pres-1 Parl-1 Seats
Sarkozy 0.311788 0.395382 0.542461
Rightist 0 0.0603554 0.0554593
LePen 0.104428 0.0428853 0.
Royal 0.258722 0.247325 0.322357
Leftist 0.12787 0.108313 0.0710572
Bayrou 0.185736 0.0761295 0.00519931
Other 0.0114557 0.0696103 0.0034662
Valid 1. 1. 1.
Zero 0.0145658 0.353607 0
Total 1.01457 1.35361 1.
Some conclusions are: 
(1) Sarkozy did not maintain the 19 million votes of the final round of the presidential elections. He even dropped to
below the original support of that first round. His final result in parliament is caused by the overall drop in participation
and the plurality run-off voting system.
(2) Bayrou who should have been president, i.e. based upon the original preferences revealed by the two rounds of the
presidential elections, was annihilated by the same voting system (and of course the irrationality of the French voter not
to recognize the right voting system, or the right strategy within the wrong system to get the same result).
(3) Significant minorities are not or inadequately represented in French parliament. 
(4) With the current system of electing parlement, it would still be suboptimal to have parliament elect the president.
The results are too far from proportionality to give a proper reflection of the national sentiment.
(5) Having voters go to the ballot box four times to achieve a suboptimal and undemocratic result does not report well
for a country that says to be proud of its rationality and democracy.
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